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Abstract

Cools (2006) suggested that prefrontal dopamine levels are related to cognitive stability
whereas striatal dopamine levels are related to cognitive plasticity. With such a wide
ranging role, almost all cognitive activities should be affected by dopamine levels in the
brain. Not surprisingly, factors influencing brain dopamine levels have been shown to
improve/worsen performance in many behavioral experiments. On the one hand, Nadler
and his colleagues (2010) showed that positive affect (which is thought to increase
cortical dopamine levels) improves a type of categorization that depends on explicit
reasoning (rule-based) but not a type that depends on procedural learning (informationintegration). On the other hand, Parkinson’s disease (which is known to decrease
dopamine levels in both the striatum and cortex) produces proactive interference in the
odd-man-out task (Flowers & Robertson, 1985) and renders subjects insensitive to
negative feedback during reversal learning (Cools et al., 2006). This article uses the
COVIS model of categorization to simulate the effects of different dopamine levels in
categorization, reversal learning, and the odd-man-out task. The results show a good
match between the simulated and human data, which suggests that the role of dopamine
in COVIS can account for several cognitive enhancements and deficits related to
dopamine levels in healthy and patient populations.

Keywords: Dopamine, COVIS, Parkinson’s disease, positive affect, computational
modeling.
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Introduction
Dopamine (DA) is a prominent neuromodulator that is found in many different

brain areas. Cools (2006) suggested that prefrontal dopamine levels are related to
cognitive stability whereas striatal dopamine levels are related to cognitive plasticity.
With such a wide ranging role, almost all cognitive activities should be affected by
dopamine levels in the brain. Not surprisingly, factors influencing brain dopamine levels
have been shown to affect performance in many behavioral experiments (for a review,
see Cools, 2006). For this reason, computational cognitive neuroscience models
increasingly include a role for DA in their processing (e.g., Ashby, Alfonso-Reese,
Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Ashby & Casale, 2003; Moustafa & Gluck, 2010).
Because DA plays such an important role in cognition, cognitive neuroscientists
have worked on identifying experimental manipulations and conditions that can affect
brain DA levels. For instance, positive affect (e.g., good mood) is thought to increase the
amount of cortical DA (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). As another example, Parkinson’s
disease (PD) is caused by the death of DA producing cells in the substantia nigra pars
compacta (SNpc) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA), which result in reduced DA
levels in the striatum and the prefrontal cortex (Cools, 2006). In this article, we simulate
the effects of positive affect and PD on cortical and basal ganglia DA levels in a
computational model based on the COVIS theory of categorization (Ashby et al., 1998).
The results of three simulations show that DA levels in COVIS modulate performance in
a manner that mimics the effect of DA imbalance in humans.
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The COVIS theory of category learning
COVIS (Ashby et al., 1998) is a neurobiologically detailed theory of category

learning that postulates two systems that compete throughout learning – an explicit,
hypothesis-testing system that uses logical reasoning and depends on working memory
and executive attention, and an implicit system that uses procedural learning. The
explicit, hypothesis-testing system of COVIS is thought to mediate rule-based category
learning. Rule-based category-learning tasks are those in which the category structures
can be learned via some explicit reasoning process. Frequently, the rule that maximizes
accuracy (i.e., the optimal rule) is easy to describe verbally. In the most common
applications, only one stimulus dimension is relevant, and the observer’s task is to
discover this relevant dimension and then to map the different dimensional values to the
relevant categories. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, Chelune, Talley,
Kay, & Curtiss, 1993) is a well-known rule-based task. More complex rule-based tasks
can require attention to multiple stimulus dimensions. For example, any task where the
optimal strategy is to apply a logical conjunction or disjunction is rule-based. The key
requirement is that the optimal strategy can be discovered by logical reasoning and is
easy for humans to describe verbally.
The implicit procedural-learning system of COVIS is hypothesized to mediate
information-integration category learning. Information-integration tasks are those in
which accuracy is maximized only if information from two or more stimulus components
(or dimensions) is integrated at some pre-decisional stage. Perceptual integration could
take many forms – from treating the stimulus as a Gestalt to computing a weighted linear
combination of the dimensional values. Typically, the optimal strategy in information-
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integration tasks is difficult or impossible to describe verbally. Rule-based strategies can
be applied in information-integration tasks, but they generally lead to sub-optimal levels
of accuracy because rule-based strategies make separate decisions about each stimulus
component, rather than integrating this information.
3
3.1

Dopamine imbalances and their effect on rule-based tasks
Dopamine depletion
The effect of DA depletion in rule-based tasks can be assessed by reviewing the

literature on PD. Rule-based tasks demand attention, working memory, and logical
reasoning and PD patients display many of the same deficits in these tasks as patients
with frontal lobe damage (Owen, Roberts, Hodges, & Robbins, 1993). This section
reviews empirical evidence for rule-related deficits in PD patients, with a focus on
ineffective use of feedback and proactive interference. Note that other rule-based PD
deficits, such as rule-based category learning and perseverative tendencies in the WCST
have already been simulated by a COVIS-based model (Helie, Paul, & Ashby, 2011).
Cools, Altamirano, and D’Esposito (2006) asked subjects to predict the outcome
of a rule-based gambling task where one stimulus was associated with a reward while the
other was associated with a punishment. The stimulus-outcome assignments periodically
changed during the task (reversal trials). On reversal trials, subjects received either
unexpected positive or unexpected negative feedback. Interestingly, PD patients
performed worse in the unexpected negative feedback condition than controls. This
suggests that PD patients may have an inability to leverage negative feedback
appropriately in this reversal learning paradigm. Similarly, another study using a
probabilistic task (Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004) found that PD patients were
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better at learning from positive than from negative feedback. Together, these results
suggest that learning from negative feedback is less effective relative to positive feedback
in PD patients. Control (age-matched) subjects in both tasks did not show such
differential learning performances with positive and negative feedback.
PD patients also suffer from proactive interference in rule application. In testing
PD patients in the Odd-Man-Out (OMO) choice discrimination task (a task where
subjects need to pick the odd-man-out in a grouping of three stimuli), Flowers and
Robertson (1985) found that PD patients were relatively unimpaired on the first block of
trials using one rule (i.e., performance was quite close to controls), but were subsequently
impaired in later blocks using either a different rule, or the same original rule. In fact,
their performance decrement was only slightly improved when told explicitly what rule to
use when selecting the OMO stimulus: subjects never reacquired the same performance
level as at the beginning of the test. In a similar task where subjects were required to
alternate their response strategy on a trial-by-trial basis, PD patients produced more false
alarms than controls, but only for long time intervals between targets (Ravizza & Ivry,
2001). Taken together, these results show that PD patients are sensitive to proactive
interference in which early response strategies negatively impact later performance.
3.2

Dopamine elevation
While the studies described above dealt with DA depletion, DA elevations are

also thought to have an important impact on rule-based processing. Ashby and his
colleagues (1999) reviewed evidence suggesting that cortical dopamine levels are
elevated during periods of positive affect. First, dopamine neurons are known to increase
their firing following unexpected rewards (e.g., Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997), and
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the giving of an unexpected reward (e.g., a gift) is a common method of inducing positive
affect in test subjects (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999). Second, drugs that mimic the effects of
dopamine (i.e., dopamine agonists) or that enhance dopaminergic activity, elevate
feelings (e.g., Beatty, 1995). These drugs include morphine and apomorphine (agonists),
cocaine (which blocks reuptake), amphetamines (which increase dopamine release), and
naturally produced endorphins (e.g., Beatty, 1995; Harte, Eifert, & Smith, 1995). Finally,
dopamine antagonists (i.e., neuroleptics) are thought to flatten affect.
Many studies have shown that positive affect improves creative problem solving,
facilitates recall of some material, and generally facilitates cognitive flexibility, and
Ashby et al. (1999) proposed that these performance improvements were largely due to
the elevations in cortical dopamine levels that occur as a result of the improved affect.
More recently, Nadler, Rabi, and Minda (2010) studied the effects of positive affect on
rule-based and information-integration category learning. Before categorization training,
standard methods were used to induce a neutral or positive affect in each subject (i.e.,
listening to music and watching videos). Results showed that relative to the neutral affect
controls, positive affect subjects performed better in rule-based categorization, but not in
information-integration categorization.
4

A computational implementation of COVIS
The computational version of COVIS described in this section is an extension of

Ashby, Paul, and Maddox (2011) and Helie et al. (2011). It includes three separate
components – namely a model of the hypothesis-testing system, a model of the
procedural-learning system, and an algorithm that monitors the output of these two
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systems and selects a response on each trial. The following subsections describe these
components.
4.1

The hypothesis-testing system
The hypothesis-testing system in COVIS selects and tests explicit rules that

determine category membership. The simplest rule is one-dimensional. More complex
rules are constructed from one-dimensional rules via Boolean algebra (e.g., to produce
logical conjunctions, disjunctions, etc.). The neural structures that have been implicated
in this process include the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, head of the caudate
nucleus, and hippocampus (Ashby et al., 1998, 2005; Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010).
The computational implementation of the COVIS hypothesis-testing system is a hybrid
neural network that includes both symbolic and connectionist components. The model’s
hybrid character arises from its combination of explicit rule selection and switching and
its incremental salience-learning component.
To begin, denote the set of all possible explicit rules by R = {R1, R2, …, Rm}. In
most applications, the set R will include all possible one-dimensional rules, and perhaps a
variety of plausible conjunction and/or disjunction rules. On each trial, the model selects
one of these rules for application by following an algorithm that is described below.
Suppose the stimuli to be categorized vary across trials on r stimulus dimensions.
Denote the coordinates of the stimulus on these r dimensions by x = (x1, x2, …, xr). On
trials when the active rule is Ri, a response is selected by computing a discriminant value
hE(x) and using the following decision rule:
Respond A on trial n if hE(x) < εE;
Respond B if hE(x) > εE

(1)
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where εE is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance σ 2E . The
variance σ 2E increases with trial-by-trial variability in the subject’s perception of the
stimulus and memory of the decision criterion (i.e., perceptual and criterial noise). In the
case where Ri is a one-dimensional rule in which the relevant dimension is i, the
discriminant function is
hE(x) = xi – Ci

(2)

where Ci is a constant that plays the role of a decision criterion. Note that this rule is
equivalent to deciding whether the stimulus value on dimension i is greater or less than
the criterion Ci. The decision bound is the set of all points for which xi – Ci = 0. Note that
| hE(x) | increases with the distance between the stimulus and this bound.
Suppose rule Ri is used on trial n. Then the rule selection process proceeds as
follows. If the response on trial n is correct, then rule Ri is used again on trial n + 1 with
probability 1. If the response on trial n is incorrect, then the probability of selecting each
rule in the set R for use on trial n + 1 is a function of that rule’s current weight. The
weight associated with each rule is determined by the subject’s lifetime history with that
rule, the reward history associated with that rule during the current categorization training
session, the tendency of the subject to perseverate, and the tendency of the subject to
select unusual or creative rules. These factors are all formalized as described next.
Let Zk(n) denote the salience of rule Rk on trial n. Therefore, Zk(0) is the initial
salience of rule Rk. Rules that subjects have abundant prior experience with have high
initial salience, and rules that a subject has rarely used before have low initial salience. In
typical applications of COVIS, the initial saliencies of all one-dimensional rules are set
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equal, whereas the initial saliencies of conjunctive and disjunctive rules are set much
lower. The salience of a rule is adjusted after every trial on which it is used, in a manner
that depends on whether or not the rule was successful. For example, if rule Rk is used on
trial n – 1 and a correct response occurs, then
Zk(n) = Zk(n – 1) + ∆C

(3)

where ∆C is some positive constant. If rule Rk is used on trial n – 1 and an error occurs,
then
Zk(n) = Zk(n – 1) – ∆E

(4)

where ∆E is also a positive constant. The numerical value of ∆C should depend on the
perceived gain associated with a correct response and ∆E should depend on the perceived
cost of an error.
The salience of each rule is then adjusted to produce a weight, Y, according to the
following rules. For the rule Ri that was active on trial n,
Yi(n) = Zi(n) + γ

(5)

where the constant γ is a measure of the tendency of the subject to perseverate on the
active rule, even though feedback indicates that this rule is incorrect. If γ is small, then
switching will be easy, whereas switching is difficult if γ is large. COVIS assumes that
switching of executive attention is mediated within the head of the caudate nucleus, and
that the parameter γ is inversely related to basal ganglia DA levels.
Choose a rule at random from R. Call this rule Rj. The weight for this rule is
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Yj(n) = Zj(n) + X

(6)

where X is a random variable that has a Poisson distribution with mean λ. Larger values
of λ increase the probability that rule Rj will be selected for the next trial, so λ is called
the selection parameter. COVIS assumes that selection is mediated by a cortical network
that includes the anterior cingulate and the prefrontal cortex, and that λ increases with
cortical DA levels. For any other rule Rk (i.e., Rk ≠ Ri or Rj),
Yk(n) = Zk(n)

(7)

Finally, rule Rk (for all k) is selected for use on trial n + 1 with probability

Pn +1 ( R k ) =

Yka ( n )
m

∑Y

a
s

(8)

(n)

s =1

where a is a parameter that determines the decision stochasticity. When a < 1, the
decision is noisy and the probability differences are diminished (making the decision
probabilities more uniform). When a > 1, the decision tends to become more
deterministic. Hence, COVIS assumes that a increases with cortical DA (Ashby &
Casale, 2003). This algorithm has a number of attractive properties. First, the more
salient the rule, the higher the probability that it will be selected, even after an incorrect
trial. Second, after the first trial, feedback is used to adjust the selection probabilities up
or down, depending on the success of the rule type. Third, the model has separate
selection and switching parameters, reflecting the COVIS assumption that these are
separate operations. The random variable X models the selection operation. The greater
the mean of X (i.e., λ) in Eq. 6, the greater the probability that the selected rule (Rj) will
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become active. In contrast, the parameter γ from Eq. 5 models switching, because when γ
is large, it is unlikely that the system will switch to the selected rule Rj. It is important to
note, however, that with both parameters (i.e., λ and γ), optimal performance occurs at
intermediate numerical values. For example, note that if λ is too large, some extremely
low salience rules will be selected, and if γ is too low then a single incorrect response
could cause a subject to switch away from an otherwise successful rule.
4.2

The Procedural System
The current implementation of the procedural system is called the Striatal Pattern

Classifier (SPC: Ashby & Waldron, 1999; Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007). The SPC
learns to assign responses to regions of perceptual space. In such models, a decision
bound could be defined as the set of all points that separate regions assigned to different
responses, but it is important to note that in the SPC, the decision bound has no
psychological meaning. As the name suggests, the SPC assumes the key site of learning
is at cortical-striatal synapses within the striatum.
The SPC architecture is shown in Figure 1 for an application to a categorization
task with two contrasting categories. This is a straightforward three-layer feedforward
network with up to 10,000 units in the input layer and two units each in the hidden and
output layers. The only modifiable synapses are between the input and hidden layers. The
more biologically detailed version of this model proposed in Ashby et al. (2007) included
lateral inhibition between striatal units and between cortical units. In the absence of such
inhibition, the top motor output layer in Figure 1 represents a conceptual placeholder for
the striatum's projection to premotor areas. This layer is not included in the following
computational description.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
The key structure in the model is the striatum (i.e., the putamen; Ell, Helie, &
Hutchinson, in press; Waldschmidt & Ashby, 2011), which is a major input region of the
basal ganglia. In humans and other primates, all of extra-striate cortex projects directly to
the striatum and these projections are characterized by massive convergence, with the
dendritic field of each medium spiny cell innervated by the axons of approximately
380,000 cortical pyramidal cells (Kincaid, Zheng, & Wilson, 1998). COVIS assumes
that, through a procedural-learning process, each striatal unit associates an abstract motor
program with a large group of sensory cortical neurons (i.e., all that project strongly to
it).
The dendrites of striatal medium spiny neurons are covered in protuberances
called spines. These play a critical role in the model because glutamate projections from
sensory cortex and DA projections from the SNpc converge (i.e., synapse) on the
dendritic spines of the medium spiny cells. COVIS assumes that these synapses are a
critical site of procedural learning.
4.2.1

Activation equations
Sensory cortex is modeled as an ordered array of up to 10,000 units, each tuned to

a different stimulus. The model assumes that each unit responds maximally when its
preferred stimulus is presented, and that its response decreases as a Gaussian function of
the distance in stimulus space between the stimulus preferred by that unit and the
presented stimulus. Specifically, when a stimulus is presented, the activation in sensory
cortical unit K on trial n is given by
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I K (n) = e

−

d (K , s timulus ) 2

α

(9)

where α is a constant that scales the unit of measurement in stimulus space and d(K,
stimulus) is the distance (in stimulus space) between the stimulus preferred by unit K and
the presented stimulus (smaller α produces a smaller unit of measurement). Eq. 9 is an
example of a radial basis function, a popular method for modeling the receptive fields of
sensory units in models of many cognitive tasks.
COVIS assumes that the activation in striatal unit J (within the middle or hidden
layer) on trial n, denoted SJ(n), is determined by the weighted sum of activations in all
sensory cortical cells that project to it:

S J (n) = ∑ wK , J (n) I K (n) + ε I

(10)

K

where wK,J(n) is the strength of the synapse between cortical unit K and striatal cell J on
trial n, IK(n) is the input from visual cortical unit K on trial n, and εI is normally
distributed noise (with mean 0 and variance σ 2P ; in all the present simulations, σ 2P = 0.9).
In a task with two alternative categories, A and B, the decision rule is:
Respond A on trial n if SA(n) > SB(n);
Otherwise respond B.

(11)

Hence, smaller σ 2P tend to produce more deterministic behaviors. The synaptic strengths
wK,J(n) are adjusted up and down from trial-to-trial via reinforcement learning, which is
described below.
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Learning equations
The three factors thought to be necessary to strengthen cortical-striatal synapses

are 1) strong pre-synaptic activation, 2) strong post-synaptic activation, and 3) DA levels
above baseline (e.g., see Arbuthnott, Ingham, & Wickens, 2000; Ashby & Helie, 2011).
According to this model, the synapse between a neuron in sensory association cortex and
a medium spiny neuron in the striatum is strengthened if the cortical neuron responds
strongly to the presented stimulus, the striatal neuron is also strongly activated (i.e.,
factors 1 and 2 are present) and the subject is rewarded for responding correctly (factor
3). On the other hand, the strength of the synapse will weaken if the subject responds
incorrectly (factor 3 is missing), or if the synapse is driven by a cell in sensory cortex that
does not produce much activation in the striatum (i.e., factor 2 is missing).
Let wK,J(n) denote the strength of the synapse on trial n between cortical unit K
and striatal unit J. COVIS models reinforcement learning as follows:

w K,J (n + 1) = w K,J (n)
+

+

+

+

+ α w IK (n)[SJ (n) − θNMDA ] [D(n) − Dbase ] [1− w K ,J (n)]
− β w IK (n)[SJ (n) − θ NMDA ] [Dbase − D(n)] w K,J (n)
+

(12)

+

− γ w IK (n)[θ NMDA − SJ (n)] × [SJ (n) − θ AMPA ] w K ,J (n).
The function [g(n)]+ = g(n) if g(n) > 0, and otherwise g(n) = 0. The constant Dbase is the
baseline DA level, D(n) is the amount of DA released following feedback on trial n, and
αw, βw, γw, θNMDA, and θAMPA are all constants. The first three of these (i.e., αw, βw, and γw)
operate like standard learning rates because they determine the magnitudes of increases
and decreases in synaptic strength (in all the simulations herein, αw = 0.35, βw = 0.45, and
γw, = 0.15). The constants θNMDA and θAMPA represent the activation thresholds for post-
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synaptic NMDA and AMPA (more precisely, non-NMDA) glutamate receptors,
respectively. The numerical value of θNMDA > θAMPA because NMDA receptors have a
higher threshold for activation than AMPA receptors. This is critical because NMDA
receptor activation is required to strengthen corticostriatal synapses (Calabresi, Pisani,
Mercuri, & Bernardi, 1992). Note that the values assigned to θNMDA and θAMPA are used to
discriminate between the postsynaptic activation of the different striatal cells. As such,
mid-level values should be selected (because values too high or too low will not allow for
such discrimination).
The second line in Eq. 12 describes the conditions under which synapses are
strengthened (i.e., striatal activation above the threshold for NMDA receptor activation
and DA above baseline) and lines three and four describe conditions that cause the
synapse to be weakened. The first possibility (line 3) is that post-synaptic activation is
above the NMDA threshold but DA is below baseline (as on an error trial), and the
second possibility is that striatal activation is between the AMPA and NMDA thresholds.
Note that synaptic strength does not change if post-synaptic activation is below the
AMPA threshold.
4.2.3

Dopamine model
The Eq. 12 model of reinforcement learning requires that we specify the amount

of DA released on every trial in response to the feedback signal (the D(n) term). The key
empirical results are (Schultz et al., 1997): 1) midbrain DA cells fire spontaneously (i.e.,
tonically), 2) DA release increases above baseline following unexpected reward, and the
more unexpected the reward the greater the release, and 3) DA release decreases below
baseline following unexpected absence of reward, and the more unexpected the absence,
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the greater the decrease. One common interpretation of these results is that over a wide
range, DA firing is proportional to the reward prediction error (RPE):
RPE = Obtained Reward - Predicted Reward

(13)

A simple model of DA release can be built by specifying how to compute
Obtained Reward, Predicted Reward, and exactly how the amount of DA release is
related to the RPE. Our solution to these three problems is as follows.
In applications that do not vary the valence of the rewards (e.g., in designs where
all correct responses receive the same feedback, as do all errors), the obtained reward Rn
on trial n is defined as +1 if correct or reward feedback is received, 0 in the absence of
feedback, and -1 if error feedback is received. COVIS computes the predicted reward on
trial n from the single-operator learning model (Bush & Mosteller, 1955):
Pn = Pn-1 + .025(Rn-1 – Pn-1)

(14)

It is well known that when computed in this fashion, Pn converges exponentially to the
expected reward value and then fluctuates around this value until reward contingencies
change.
Bayer and Glimcher (2005) reported activity in midbrain DA cells as a function of
RPE. A simple model that nicely matches their results is:

Dmax



D(n) =  Dslope × RPE + Dbase



0


if RPE >
if -

Dmax − Dbase
Dslope

Dbase
D − Dbase
≤ RPE ≤ max
Dslope
Dslope
if RPE < -

Dbase
Dslope

(15)
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where Dmax, Dslope, and Dbase are constants. This model is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that
the baseline DA level is Dbase (i.e., when the RPE = 0) and that DA levels increase
linearly with the RPE. In general, higher values of Dmax allow for a larger increase in DA
following unexpected reward, higher values of Dbase allow for a larger decrease of DA
following the unexpected absence of reward, and higher values of Dslope increase the
effect of RPE on DA release. Thus, increasing the value of any of these constants should
improve learning in the procedural system (up to a point).
Insert Figure 2 about here
4.3

Resolving the competition between the hypothesis-testing and procedural systems
Since on any trial the model can make only one response, the final task is to

decide which of the two systems will control the observable response. In COVIS, this
competition is resolved by combining two factors: the confidence each system has in the
accuracy of its response, and how much each system can be trusted. In the case of the
hypothesis-testing system, confidence equals the absolute value of the discriminant
function | hE(n) |. When | hE(n) | = 0, the stimulus is exactly on the hypothesis-testing
system’s decision bound, so the model has no confidence in its ability to predict the
correct response. When | hE(n) | is large, the stimulus is far from the bound and
confidence is high. In the procedural system, confidence is defined as the absolute value
of the difference between the activation values in the two striatal units:
| hP(n) | = | SA(n) – SB(n) |

(16)

The logic of Eq. 16 is similar to that of the hypothesis-testing system: When
| hP(n) | = 0, the stimulus is equally activating both striatal units, so the procedural system
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has no confidence in its ability to predict the correct response, and when | hP(n) | is large,
the evidence strongly favors one response over the other. One problem with this approach
is that | hE(n) | and | hP(n) | will typically have different upper limits, which makes them
difficult to compare. For this reason, these values are normalized to a [0,1] scale on every
trial. This is done by dividing each discriminant value by its maximum possible value.
The amount of trust that is placed in each system is a function of an initial bias
toward the hypothesis-testing system, and the previous success history of each system.
On trial n, the trust in each system increases with the system weights, θE(n) and θP(n),
where it is assumed that θE(n) + θP(n) = 1. In typical applications, COVIS assumes that
the initial trust in the hypothesis-testing system is much higher than in the procedural
system, partly because initially there is no procedural learning to use. A common
assumption is that θE(1) = 0.99 and θI(1) = 0.01. As the experiment progresses, feedback
is used to adjust the two system weights up or down depending on the success of the
relevant component system. This is done in the following way. If the hypothesis-testing
system suggests the correct response on trial n then

θE(n+1) = θE(n) + ∆OC[1 – θE(n)]

(17)

where ∆OC is a parameter. If instead, the hypothesis-testing system suggests an incorrect
response then
θE(n+1) = θE(n) – ∆OEθE(n)

(18)

where ∆OE is another parameter. The two regulatory terms on the end of Eqs. 17 and 18
restrict θE(n) to the range 0 < θE(n) < 1. Finally, on every trial, θP(n+1) = 1 – θE(n+1).
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Thus, Eqs. 17 and 18 also guarantee that θP(n) falls in the range 0 < θP(n) < 1. The value
assigned to ∆OC should be positively related to the model persistence toward hypothesis
testing, whereas the value assigned to ∆OE should be positively related to the model
willingness to switch to the procedural system.
The last step is to combine confidence and trust. This is done multiplicatively, so
the overall system decision rule is: emit the response suggested by the hypothesis-testing
system if θE(n) | hE(n) | > θP(n) | hP(n) |; otherwise emit the response suggested by the
procedural system.
5
5.1

Modeling dopamine imbalances with COVIS
Parkinson’s disease
DA cells in the SNpc and the VTA die in PD, which results in decreased DA

levels in the prefrontal cortex and the striatum. In COVIS, DA has a differential effect on
the hypothesis-testing and procedural systems. In the hypothesis-testing system, rule
selection should improve as levels of DA rise in frontal cortex (up to some optimal level),
and rule switching should improve if levels of DA rise in the head of the caudate nucleus.
Thus, the selection parameter λ should increase with DA levels in frontal cortex, and the
switching parameter γ is assumed to decrease with increased DA levels in the caudate
nucleus. In addition, DA in the prefrontal cortex is hypothesized to increase signal-tonoise ratio (Ashby & Casale, 2003). Hence, a in Eq. 4 should increase with DA levels
(similar to λ), and σ E2 should decrease with more DA (similar to γ). In the procedural
system, DA plays a crucial role in learning: it provides the reward signal required for
reinforcement learning. A decreased DA baseline or range can affect the ability of the
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procedural system to learn stimulus-response associations. Hence, decreasing DA levels
in the striatum should decrease the values assigned to Dbase, Dslope, and Dmax.
5.2

Positive affect
According to Ashby et al. (1999), positive affect increases DA levels in frontal

cortex, with a much smaller effect in the striatum. This is because the concentration of
the dopamine re-uptake molecule DAT is high in the striatum and low in cortex. Thus,
dopamine released to the events that induce the positive affect will be cleared quickly
from the striatum and slowly from cortex. In COVIS, frontal cortex plays a significant
role only in the explicit (hypothesis-testing) system. As argued in Section 5.1, rule
selection should improve as levels of DA rise in frontal cortex (up to some optimal level).
Thus, the selection parameter λ should increase with cortical DA levels. In addition, DA
in the prefrontal cortex increases signal-to-noise ratio (Ashby & Casale, 2003). Hence, a
in Eq. 4 should increase with DA levels (similar to λ), and σ E2 should decrease.
5.3

Other factors affecting dopamine levels
Many factors are known to affect brain DA levels including age, genetic

predisposition, drug-taking history, and neuropsychological patient status (Ashby et al.,
1999). For example, brain DA levels are known to decrease by approximately 7% per
decade of life due to normal aging, and PD patients are thought to have lost at least 70%
of their birth DA levels (Gotham et al., 1988; Price, Filoteo, & Maddox, 2009). Hence, in
COVIS, we model an ordinal relationship where DA(Positive affect; Pos) ≥ DA(Young
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adults; YC) ≥ DA(Old adults; OC) ≥ DA(PD) (where more DA results in lower γ and σ E2 ,
and higher λ, a, Dbase, Dslope, and Dmax).1
Note that Dbase and Dmax were calculated to reflect the proportion of DA cells
remaining as a function of age and diagnosis (Helie et al., 2011). For instance, in the
studies considered here, young adults (YC) are usually undergraduate students in their
late teens or early 20s. Hence, they should have approximately 86% of their birth DA
levels (assuming they lost 7% of birth DA per decade of life). Typically, these subjects
have been modeled with Dbase = 0.20 and Dmax = 1.00 (e.g., Ashby & Crossley, 2011;
Ashby et al., 2011). Likewise, age-matched controls (OC) are typically about 70 years
old and should thus have 50% of their birth DA level. As such, their Dbase was set to 0.15
and their Dmax was set to 0.60. Finally, on average PD patients are predicted to have 30%
of their birth DA remaining. Hence, their Dbase was set to 0.10 and their Dmax was set to
0.35. Thus, only five DA-related parameters were varied in the simulations (i.e., γ, σ E2 , λ,
a, and Dslope).
6

Simulations
In this section, we test the COVIS model of DA imbalance against data from three

well-known tasks, namely rule-based reversal learning, the OMO task, and perceptual
categorization. The first two tasks focused on DA depletion and compared the
performance of YC and OC with PD patients. In contrast, the last task focused on DA
elevations and compared the performance of subjects with neutral and positive affect.

1

Note that DA(Pos) ≥ DA(YC) only for cortical DA parameters (i.e., σ 2E , λ, and a). For striatal

DA parameters (i.e., γ, Dbase, Dslope, and Dmax), DA(Pos) = DA(YC).
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The values given to the DA-related parameters in all simulations are shown in Table 1.
Note that only these parameters were varied to simulate the different subject populations.
In addition to these DA-related parameters, COVIS also requires setting some taskrelated parameters (which did not vary when modeling the different subject populations).
These are shown in Table 2. Note that none of the parameters were optimized; reasonable
values were assigned using a rough grid search.
Insert Table 1 about here
Insert Table 2 about here
6.1

Ineffective use of negative feedback in Parkinson’s disease
The following simulation addresses the ineffective use of negative feedback by

PD patients. The key result is that an unexpected reward allows the PD patient to learn
and to adjust his or her behavior, but an unexpected punishment is not as effective in
eliciting a change in behavior (Cools et al., 2006). In contrast, age-matched controls are
as likely to modify their behavior following unexpected reward or punishment.
6.1.1

Experiment
Cools et al. (2006) compared the performance of 10 PD patients with 12 aged-

matched controls in a reversal-learning task. On each trial the subject saw two stimuli,
one of which was highlighted. The subject’s task was to predict whether the highlighted
stimulus would lead to a reward or a punishment. The outcome (reward or punishment)
was presented after the subject had responded and was non-contingent on the subject’s
prediction. Hence, the subject needed to generate his or her own internal second-order
feedback (e.g., something like “I predicted a reward, the outcome was a reward, therefore
my response was correct”). The stimuli were the same on every trial; the only thing that
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changed was which stimulus was highlighted. At the beginning of each block, one of the
stimuli was randomly associated with the reward outcome while the other was associated
with the punishment outcome (this assignment was unknown to the subject). After a
learning criterion was reached, the previously learned association was reversed. The
learning criterion was a pseudo-random number of consecutive correct responses that
varied between 5 and 9. Each block was composed of 120 trials, and the maximum
number of reversals within each block was 14. There were two types of blocks:
unexpected reward and unexpected punishment. In the former, the previously punished
stimulus was highlighted on the reversal trial and was followed by a reward outcome. In
the latter, the previously rewarded stimulus was highlighted on the reversal trial and was
followed by a punishment outcome. The dependent measure was the total number of
completed stages in each type of block (a stage is a stimulus-reward assignment). The
results are shown in Figure 3 (gray bars). As can be seen, the PD patients (right panel)
completed more stages in the unexpected reward blocks then in the unexpected
punishment blocks. In contrast, the type of block (i.e., unexpected reward or unexpected
punishment) did not affect the performance of the aged-matched control subjects (left
panel).
Insert Figure 3 about here
6.1.2

Simulation
Two hundred simulations were run for each subject group using the COVIS

model described in Section 4. The procedural system received a display-specific
representation of the stimuli whereas the hypothesis-testing system received a conceptual
representation. Because the stimuli were not perceptually confusable, radial basis
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functions were not used in the procedural system. Hence, the stimuli presented to the
procedural system were 4-dimensional binary vectors. The first two rows coded the first
stimulus and the last two rows coded the second stimulus. In both cases, if the stimulus
was highlighted a 0 appeared in the first of these two rows and a 1 appeared in the
second. If the stimulus was not highlighted the opposite pattern appeared (i.e., 1 in first
row, 0 in second). The stimuli presented to the hypothesis-testing system were 2dimensional binary vectors (one position for each highlighted picture); thus, if stimulus i
is highlighted, then row i takes a value of 1. Note that this representation does not take
the arrangement of the two stimuli into account because it is a conceptual representation.
Each system received a separate copy of the feedback (Helie et al., 2011); however, this
experiment required subjects to generate their own second-order feedback. The
neuroscience literature suggests that the prefrontal cortex can manipulate highly abstract
forms of feedback (Wallis & Kennerley, 2010), whereas the flexibility of the basal
ganglia to manipulate feedback is largely unknown (Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman,
2000). This distinction was not relevant in previous COVIS simulations because the
feedback is generally unambiguous (i.e., both brain areas receive the same feedback), but
here the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia might receive different types of feedback.
Specifically, we assumed that the prefrontal cortex receives the self-generated secondorder feedback (correct or incorrect dependent on the accuracy of its prediction), whereas
the basal ganglia receive the outcome feedback (reward or punishment). Recall that
within COVIS, the prefrontal cortex mediates rule selection whereas the basal ganglia
mediate rule switching. Hence, when the second-order feedback is negative, but the
outcome is positive, the system may try to select a new rule without trying to switch
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away from the current rule. This makes the likelihood of successfully changing rules less
likely than when both the feedback and outcome are congruent (i.e., negative feedback
and punishment outcome). Only three free parameters were varied to simulate the data
(i.e., γ, λ, and Dslope; see Table 1). The simulation results are shown in Figure 3 (black
bars).
6.1.3

Results and discussion
COVIS produced results that were a good match to the human data. As in the

Cools et al.’s (2006) results, the performance of the simulated PD patients (right panel)
was affected by the valence of the unexpected feedback: unexpected punishment did not
lead to a change in response strategy, which ultimately led to fewer stages being
completed. In contrast, simulated aged-matched subjects (left panel) were not affected by
the valence of the unexpected feedback. These results are explained by the value assigned
to the switching parameter γ, which was much larger in simulated PD patients than in
simulated age-matched controls. This parameter assignment is responsible for the
perseverative tendencies of simulated PD patients, and resulted in simulated PD patients
being unable to disengage from the current stimulus-reward association in unexpected
punishment situations. However, in unexpected reward situations, the basal ganglia
received positive feedback, which reduced the simulated PD patients’ perseverative
tendencies and facilitated the switch to a new stimulus-reward association. Aged-matched
controls do not suffer from perseverative tendencies (reflected in the value assigned to
the switching parameter γ for this group), so the match between the feedback and
outcome did not affect their behavior. This good fit was achieved by varying only a
subset of the COVIS DA parameters (again, only three parameters were varied). This
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supports the adequacy of the COVIS DA model with respect to behavioral performance
with DA deficits.
6.2

Proactive interference of rule use in Parkinson’s disease
The following simulation addresses the proactive interference of rules in PD

patients. The key result is that the performance of PD patients is preserved when learning
a first rule, but that learning of subsequent rules is impaired (Flower & Robertson, 1985).
Control subjects do not suffer from such proactive interference.
6.2.1

Experiment
Flower and Robertson (1985) ran the OMO task to measure the presence of

proactive interference in PD patients. The experiment compared the performance of 49
PD patients with 56 aged-matched controls (OC) and 40 younger controls (YC;
undergraduate students). The stimuli in the OMO task were two decks of 16 cards. Each
card displayed three binary symbols (e.g., circles or triangles) that could each take one of
two different sizes (i.e., small or large). The subject’s task was to choose a dimension
(i.e., symbol or size) and then select the item on each card that was the OMO. For
example, consider a card that showed one large circle, one small circle, and one small
triangle. If the subject chooses the symbol dimension, the small triangle is the OMO.
However, if the subject chooses the size dimension, then the large circle is the OMO. The
dimension values for size were always the same (i.e., large, small), but the dimension
values for symbols varied within each deck (e.g., circle vs. triangle, rectangle vs.
diamond, etc.). In the first block, a deck of cards was selected and the subjects were
asked to choose a rule/dimension and consistently apply the same rule for the entire deck
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of cards. On the second block, the second deck of cards was selected and the subjects
were asked to use a different rule for the entire deck of cards (i.e., choose the other
dimension). After the second block was completed, the first deck was retrieved and the
subjects were asked to apply the first rule again (Block 3). The decks of cards (and
rules/dimensions) were alternated until each deck was used four times for a total of 8
blocks. The dependent measure was the number of correct responses in each block (see
Figure 4, left panel). As can be seen, the young and old controls exhibited stable
performance within each block. However, the PD patients suffered from proactive
interference: they made significantly more correct responses in the first block than in any
other block.
Insert Figure 4 about here
6.2.2

Simulation
The performance of 200 subjects in each group was simulated with the COVIS

model described in Section 4. As in the previous simulation, the procedural system
received an object-based representation of the stimuli whereas the hypothesis-testing
system received a feature-based representation. Also as in the previous simulation, radial
basis functions were not used in the procedural system because the stimuli were not
perceptually confusable. Hence, the stimuli presented to the procedural system were 32dimensional vectors with a 1 in position i to denote stimulus i (for i = 1, …, 32) and a 0 in
every other position. The stimuli presented to the hypothesis-testing system were 6dimensional binary vectors where every two rows represent a single figure from the
stimulus (e.g., rows 1 and 2 encode the size and shape of the first figure in the stimulus).
For each consecutive pair of rows, position i (for i = 1, 2) was assigned either a 1 or 0 to
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indicate the binary value on each dimension (size and shape only took one of two values
for each figure). Each system received a separate copy of the feedback. Four free
parameters were varied to simulate the data (i.e., σ 2E , γ, λ, and Dslope; see Table 1). The
simulation results are shown in Figure 4 (right panel).
6.2.3

Results and discussion
As in previous simulations, the model was a good fit to the data. As in the human

data, the simulated younger and older controls showed stable performance across all
blocks. However, the simulated PD patients suffered proactive interference: this version
of the model made significantly more correct responses in the first block than in any
other block. This occurred primarily because the PD version of the model had more
difficulty both selecting a new rule (lower λ) and switching away from the current rule
(higher γ) than the non-PD versions of the model. Note that the first block in this
experiment is privileged because it is the only block in which subjects are not already
applying a rule when the block begins. Thus, in the first block there is no rule to
disengage, so impaired switching and selection have less effect on performance in the
first block than on later blocks. Control subjects (both old and young) do not have
switching or selection difficulties and therefore show no sign of proactive interference.
This good fit to the data was achieved by varying only four DA-related parameters and
further supports the adequacy of COVIS as a model of DA depletion.
6.3

The effect of positive affect on cognitive flexibility
The following simulation addresses the effects of positive affect on cognitive

flexibility using a category-learning task. The key results are that DA elevations improve
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explicit rule-based categorization but have no effect on procedural-learning mediated
information-integration categorization (Nadler et al., 2010).
6.3.1

Experiment
Nadler and her colleagues (2010) asked 87 university students to listen to music

and watch videos that had been shown to induce either a neutral or positive affect in pilot
experiments (as measured using a positive affect scale). Following the mood induction,
the subjects were tested using a positive affect scale (to ensure that the manipulation
worked) and then were trained in either a rule-based or information-integration
categorization task for 320 trials. The stimuli in the categorization task were Gabor discs
varying in spatial frequency and orientation. In the rule-based condition, the optimal
strategy was to ignore the orientation of the discs and apply a rule on frequency (i.e., low
frequency stimuli were in category A and high frequency stimuli were in category B). In
the information-integration condition, the optimal strategy required subjects to integrate
the stimulus-values on the two dimensions at a pre-decisional stage and no simple verbal
strategy yielded high accuracy. The dependent measure was categorization accuracy. As
seen in Figure 5 (top panels), positive affect subjects performed better than neutral affect
subjects in rule-based categorization. However, positive affect did not yield any
advantage over neutral affect in information-integration categorization.
Insert Figure 5 about here
6.3.2

Simulation
The performance of 200 subjects in each group was simulated with the COVIS

model described in Section 4. Each stimulus was randomly generated using the same
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distributions (re-scaled to occupy a 100 × 100 grid) as in Nadler et al. (2010). In the
procedural system, the two-dimensional stimuli (frequency, orientation) were used to
activate four radial-basis functions located at coordinates (35, 35), (35, 65), (65, 35), and
(65, 65) with a common variance of 125 (on both dimensions; the covariance was 0). In
the hypothesis-testing system, a rule was selected on each trial and the stimulus value on
the rule-dimension was compared with the rule criterion to obtain the discriminant values
(as in Eq. 2).2 On each trial, a stimulus was selected and processed in each subsystem.
Each system received a separate copy of the feedback. Only two free parameters were
varied to simulate the data (i.e., σ 2E and λ). The simulation results are shown in Figure 5
(bottom panels).
6.3.3

Results and discussion
As in previous simulations, the model provided a good fit to the data. As in the

human data, positive affect improved rule-based category learning but not informationintegration category learning. This is because simulated positive affect subjects had more
cortical DA (i.e., higher λ and lower σ 2E ), which facilitated rule selection in the
hypothesis-testing system and reduced criterial noise. However, cortex plays a limited
role in information-integration categorization, which explains the absence of effect in this
condition. This good fit to the data was achieved by varying only two cortical DA-related
parameters and further supports the adequacy of COVIS as a model of the role of DA in
perceptual categorization.

2

The criterion value for each rule was set to the mean value of the stimulus set on the rule

dimension.
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Parameter sensitivity analysis
As mentioned above, all parameters were selected using a rough grid search

approach. Although the parameter values used to simulate the datasets presented were not
necessarily optimal, the model’s performance is relatively robust to deviations in exact
numerical values. Specifically, different numerical values of the parameters within a
reasonable range tend to change the performance of the model only slightly. For example,
learning rates may change, but not whether the model learns. Thus, we believe that all of
the predictions derived in this article follow in a necessary fashion from the general
architecture of the model and depend only minimally on our ability to find the optimal set
of parameter values.
To verify these observations more formally, we implemented a sensitivity
analysis for the simulation of the Nadler and colleagues (2010) data (i.e., Figure 5). The
analysis proceeded as follows. For each of the 13 parameters listed in Tables 1 and 2 as
well as four parameters described in the text (Equation 10 procedural system noise
variance parameter, σ 2P , and Equation 12 learning rate parameters αw, βw, and γw), we
successively changed the parameter estimate from the value used to generate the
predictions shown in the bottom row of Figure 5 by +10% and -10%. After each change,
we simulated the behavior of the model in the same conditions used to generate the
bottom row of Figure 5. Next, after each new simulation (and for each condition and
categorization task of Nadler et al., 2010), we computed the mean root squared error
(MRSE) between the simulated learning curve shown in the bottom row of Figure 5 and
the learning curve produced by the new version of the model. Across all parameter
adjustments (34), and for every categorization task (RB and II) and condition (positive
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and neutral affect), the average MRSE was 0.94%, suggesting that the learning
performance deviations are very slight with small changes in each parameter. To further
corroborate this observation, we re-ran the above analysis modifying each parameter by
±100%. The average MRSE across all simulations with this more extreme parameter
manipulation was 2.61%. These results suggest that, as long as the parameters are in a
reasonable range, no single parameter greatly affects the overall learning performance of
the model.
7

General Discussion
This article proposed a formal account of a variety of effects of DA imbalances on

cognitive processing. The computational model was based on the COVIS model of
categorization (Ashby et al., 1998), and both DA depletion and DA elevation was
accounted for by increasing or decreasing DA-related parameters. The effect of DA
depletion was captured by simulating the data of young adults, older adults, and
Parkinson’s disease patients in a reversal learning task (Cools et al., 2006) and the OMO
task (Flower & Robertson, 1985). DA elevation was captured by simulating the effect of
positive affect in perceptual categorization (Nadler et al., 2010). The remainder of this
article discusses alternative models of DA fluctuations and theoretical implications of the
present work.
7.1

Other computational models of dopamine imbalances
Very few computational cognitive neuroscience models of DA imbalances have

been proposed. In one of the few, Monchi, Taylor, and Dagher (2000) simulated the
effects of DA imbalances to account for the performance of PD patients and
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schizophrenics in a variety of working memory tasks. Their model includes three basal
ganglia-thalamocortical loops: two through the prefrontal cortex (one for spatial
information and the other for object information), and one through the anterior cingulate
gyrus (for strategy selection). Monchi et al. modeled the reduced DA innervation of the
striatum in PD by reducing the connection strengths in the model between cortex and the
caudate nucleus, and between the caudate nucleus and the internal segment of the globus
pallidus. In contrst, they modeled the effects of schizophrenia by reducing the gain of the
units in nucleus accumbens. The model was then used to simulate performance in a
delayed response task, a delayed match-to-sample task, and the WCST. In all of these,
PD deficits were accounted for by improper encoding of the stimuli in working memory,
and schizophrenia deficits were accounted for by a difficulty in selecting the appropriate
response strategy.
An alternative model was proposed by Frank (2005) to explain cognitive deficits
related to DA depletion in PD patients. This model includes basal ganglia-thalamocortical
loops with an emphasis on a more biologically detailed model of the basal ganglia that
included both the direct and indirect pathways. In Frank’s model, PD is simulated by
lesioning SNpc DA cells to reduce the range of DA in the basal ganglia. This reduction in
DA’s dynamic range reduces activation in the direct pathway (through D1 receptors) and
amplifies activation in the indirect pathway (through D2 receptors). In addition, DA plays
the role of the reward signal in synaptic plasticity. This model has been used to simulate a
probabilistic classification task and a probabilistic reversal learning task. In both tasks,
PD deficits were explained by abnormal direct/indirect pathway interactions.
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More recently, Moustafa and Gluck (2010, 2011) proposed a new computational
model of DA imbalance. Their model is a three-layer feed-forward connectionist network
where the input activates the prefrontal cortex, which in turn activates the striatum to
produce a response. Similar to Frank (2005), the role of phasic DA is to facilitate
synaptic plasticity while the role of tonic DA is to modulate neural activation. However,
the Moustafa and Gluck model allows for differential effects of DA in the prefrontal
cortex and striatum by varying the slope of the transfer functions and learning rates
separately for neurons in these two regions. In Mustafa and Gluck (2011), a model of the
hippocampus was added to preprocess the stimuli. PD is simulated by reducing the four
DA-related parameters (learning and gain in the PFC and striatum), while schizophrenia
is simulated by damaging the hippocampus. The model has been used to simulate
instrumental conditioning, probabilistic classification, and probabilistic reversal learning
tasks. PD impairments in these tasks were explained by noisy activation and learning
while impairments related to schizophrenia were explained by reduced stimulus-stimulus
representational learning.
7.2

Theoretical implications
One of the main contributions of the COVIS simulation of DA imbalance is that it

brings into focus the different roles of DA in different brain regions. In the Monchi et al.
(2000) and Frank (2005) models, the role of DA is restricted to producing abnormal
dynamics in the basal ganglia. Moustafa and Gluck (2010, 2011) were the first to
independently simulate the role of DA in the prefrontal cortex and striatum, but the role
of DA was the same in both regions: activation gain and learning rate. In COVIS, DA can
be independently manipulated in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia, but it also has a
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different role in each region. In the prefrontal cortex, DA facilitates rule selection and
increases signal gain (reducing noise). In the basal ganglia, DA facilitates rule switching
and synaptic plasticity. These differential roles of DA in the prefrontal cortex and the
basal ganglia not only allow for the explanation of a wider range of tasks and phenomena,
but also allow for a more fine-grained account of the effects of DA level in each task. For
instance, COVIS predicts that in rule-based categorization tasks the primary behavioral
effect of DA elevation/depression in the basal ganglia should be to facilitate/impair rule
switching (respectively). In information-integration tasks, however, DA fluctuations in
the basal ganglia should mostly affect synaptic plasticity (positively or negatively).
Previous modeling of DA imbalances did not allow for this level of specificity. In
addition, none of the previous models of DA imbalance were used to account for DA
elevations, such as those occurring with positive affect. Note that the COVIS dualprocess approach successfully modeled reversal learning without a detailed model of the
indirect pathway of the basal ganglia.
7.3

Limitation and future work
While COVIS is successful at accounting for many behavioral phenomena

observed following various DA imbalances, it cannot yet account for the differential
behavioral effects of dopaminergic medication (e.g., Cools et al., 2006; Frank et al.,
2004; Gotham et al., 1988). Two of the models reviewed in Section 7.1 have proposed a
computational account of the effects of dopaminergic medication (Frank, 2005; Moustafa
& Gluck, 2010). We have not made a similar attempt with COVIS for two different
reasons. First, Cools et al. (2006) report that different dopaminergic medications may
have different behavioral effects. For instance, post hoc analyses suggest that only
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patients treated with pramipexole were impaired in reversal learning. Most papers where
PD patients are tested ON medication report which medications appear in their samples,
but do not delineate the ON medication patients according to drug. Hence, it would be
difficult to simulate the exact behavioral effects of different PD-related drugs within a
particular sample of patients. Second, the issue of medication is further complicated by
the observation that dopaminergic treatments have different effects depending on the
progression of the disease and this interaction very well could be drug dependent. Thus,
while the variable effects of medication on PD performance were not addressed by the
current computational model, future work with COVIS could attempt to investigate the
differential effects of PD medications when these become reliably reported and
controlled in published articles.
Second, it has been hypothesized that schizophrenia may also be characterized by
DA imbalances (e.g., Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). As such, the Monchi et al.
(2000) and Mustafa and Gluck (2011) models of DA imbalance have also tried to address
schizophrenia. COVIS does not include a detailed model of the hippocampus; however,
we would adopt an approach similar to other models that manipulate DA (e.g., Cohen &
Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Monchi et al., 2000) to reflect the particular imbalance of DA in
schizophrenic patients. For example, DA in the head of the caudate nucleus and the
prefrontal cortex could be manipulated. Future work should allow us to determine
whether these adjustments to DA parameters in COVIS would produce cognitive deficits
similar to those observed in schizophrenia.
Finally, the simulations included in this manuscript were performed using a
hybrid symbolic-connectionist implementation of COVIS. More biologically detailed
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versions of both the procedural and hypothesis-testing systems of COVIS have been
implemented and used to simulate both single-unit recording and behavioral data (Ashby,
Ell, Valentin, Casale, 2005; Ashby et al., 2007). However, only behavioral data were
simulated in this article. Ashby and Helie (2011) argued that, while additional biological
details can almost always be added to a model, one should only include details that will
be tested against empirical data (i.e., the Simplicity Heuristic). Hence, because no spike
train or single-cell recordings were simulated, the hybrid symbolic-connectionist
implementation of COVIS used in this research was appropriate. Even so, future
modeling work should focus on neuroscience data where DA levels are directly
controlled, and this research should use a more biologically detailed version of COVIS.
8
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Figure 44

10 Figure captions
Figure 1. A schematic illustrating the architecture of the COVIS procedural system.
(From Helie et al., 2011.)
Figure 2. Model used to relate the amount of dopamine (DA) released as a function of
the reward prediction error (RPE).
Figure 3. Human (gray bars) and simulation (black bars) data in the reversal learning
task of Cools et al. (2006).
Figure 4. Human (left panel) and simulation (right panel) data in the OMO task of
Flowers & Robertson (1985).
Figure 5. Human and simulation data in the perceptual categorization task of Nadler et
al. (2010). The top panels show human results while the bottom panels show the
simulation results. RB = Rule-based (verbalizable); II = Information-integration (nonverbalizable).

Table 1. Dopamine-related parameters in COVIS

Parameters

Cools et al.

Flowers &

Nadler et al.

(2006)

Robertson (1985)

(2010)

OC

PD

YC

OC

PD

Pos

Neu

σE

0.22

-

0.19

0.23

0.32

0.60

1.50

γ

0.10

1.85

0.25

3.00

25.00

15.00

-

λ

12.1

12.0

9.0

7.0

0.5

7.0

1.0

a

1.1

-

1.0

-

-

1.0

-

Dslope

0.80

0.15

0.80

0.25

0.15

0.80

-

Dmax

0.60

0.35

1.00

0.60

0.35

1.00

-

Dbase

0.15

0.10

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.20

-

2

Note. YC = young control; OC = old control; PD = Parkinson’s disease patients;
Pos = Positive affect; Neu = Neutral affect. Note that Dmax and Dbase are not free
parameters. They are calculated as a function of the proportion of DA cell lost
(see Section 5.3).

Table 2. Task-related parameters in COVIS
Cools et al.

Flowers &

Nadler et al.

(2006)

Robertson (1985)

(2010)

∆C

0.11

0.09

0.04

∆E

0.43

0.05

0.01

θNMDA

0.057

0.057

0.150

θAMPA

0.0001

0.0001

0.0010

∆OC

0.05

0.05

0.04

∆OE

0.001

0.001

0.010

Parameters

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

